

SEER: Practical Memory Virus Scanning-as-a-Service for Virtualized Environments


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Data Centers and Security Software



Offload Analysis to Cloud

• System Compromise




- Cloud Based Virus Scanning Virus Scanning-as-a-Service (VSaaS)
 - Hook file operations
 - Check against all known files
 - Scan file otherwise

Virus Scanning-as-a-Service (VSaaS)

- Products and Research
 - Logical VHD Scanning [Wei et al. 2009]
 - Scanning of VHD's offline
 - Scan-Lite [Soules et al. 2009]
 - Enterprise file scanner scheduling
 - CloudAV [Oberhiede et al. 2008]
 - Network Service for scanning files on demand
 - VirusTotal
 - Network Scanning Appliances
 - TrendMicro "Deep Security"
 - Symantec End-Point Security Appliance
- Does not support memory scanning

Memory-Only Malware

• System Compromise




- Trades persistence for stealth
- Bypasses file-based Virus Scanners

Challenges: Scanning Memory

- Must scan all memory for compromise


 Virus Scanning is computationally intensive
- Changing memory can impact correctness
- Resource contention
 - Anti-Virus Storms
- File based optimizations not suitable for memory
 - File hashing

SEER Architecture & Features



Out-of-VM Off-Host Analysis

- Fast VM Snapshots
 - Create copy of running VM memory
 - Copy-On-Write



Out-of-VM Off-Host Analysis


Memory Carving 0x7E000000 – Extract memory into *Memory* Segments* • OS managed memory allocations *iexplore.exe* Memory Segment – e.g., heaps, stacks, memory mapped files Memory ieframe.dll Segment Memory stack Segment * Not x86 Segments NC STATE UNIVERSITY Computer Science 0x7E00C000

Deduplicated Data Shipping

- Only globally unique *pages* are sent off Host
- Limited impact to network
- Reduce memory extraction time

Scan Scheduler: Building Scan Configuration

- Example:
 - X-1 bytes identical
 - Duplicate
 computation




2 Similar Memory Segments: ieframe.dll

- Observation:
 - 1. Scanners read data linearly
 - 2. Scanners contain identical state for files with identical prefixes
 - Scanners duplicate computation for identical prefixes
- Goal: quickly identify prefixes across segments


Scan Scheduler: Building Scan Configuration

- Non-overlapping window hashes
 - Data independent
 - Constrained to window sizes
 - Misses at most (window size 1) bytes of data



Scan Scheduler: Building Scan Configuration

- Encoding Prefixes*
 - Track all unique prefixes for all *memory segments*
 - Directed Rooted Tree
 - Each node represents a range of data to scan
 - Child nodes represent different data



*Algorithm and Optimizations in Paper

Prefix-Based Scanning

- Adapting a Virus Scanner
 - Modified ClamAV
 - Open source virus scanner
 - Only 9 lines modified
 - Shared library to hook file operations
 - Scan tree is walked during reads
 - Scanner is forked at node boundaries
 - Ignore non-present pages

Evaluation

- Impact of SEER on Guest VMs
- Efficiency of Prefix-Based Scanning
- Ability to find malware in memory

- Setup:
 - KVM Virtual Machines
 - Windows 7 SP1
 - 1GB Ram

Impact on Guest VMs


- Measure degradation of throughput during shipping of deduplicated data
- Specweb'2009 Banking Application

- Simulate 200 clients


VM Impact	MB/s	Resp. Time	Snapshot Time	Data Shipped
Scanned	8.02%	9.14%	4.90 sec	153.4 MB
Non- Scanned	0.70%	0.76%	4.48 sec	140.4 MB

- Three Scanner configurations:
 - 1. Naïve Unmodified ClamAV
 - 2. Prefix Matched with Normalization (PMN)
 - 3. Prefix Matched with Normalization ignoring Non-Present (**PMNP**)
- Three VM configurations:
 - 1. Boot to Login
 - 2. Webserver w/ 100 simultaneous clients
 - 3. Assorted GUI applications

- Percent data savings and to scan
 - X-axis is window size
 - PMN (40-45%), PMNP (80-90%) reduction





- Total scan-time for single VMs
 - X-axis is window size
 - PMN (20-42%), PMNP (62-72%) reduction




• Savings of scanning multiple VMs

- Window size 32KB





- Effects of caching previous scan data
 - Boot to login
 - PMNP (~50%) 32KB window



Identifying Malware in Memory

- False Positives
 - Overly broad virus definitions
 - 154 of 2,056,340 MD5 hashes were of zeroed data
 - In host virus scanners
- Identified Malware Malware Types **#** Samples Trojan.Adload 2 – Memory-Only Trojan.NSIS.Agent NSIS.Clicker.Agent 1 • Meterpreter W32. AdInstall Trojan.IRC.Zapchast - File Based WIN.Trojan.DarkKomet Trojan.Adload • Cerberus RAT Adware.Cpush Trojan.Spy 2 17 Total

Conclusion

- Architecture for practical Memory VSaaS
- Transparency to guest VMs
- Minimal impact to network
- Proposed new technique for scanning unique data
 - -72% reduction wall time (cold cache)
 - 50% reduction wall time (warm cache)



• Questions?



